

AFTER EXONERATION: AN INVESTIGATION OF STIGMA AND WRONGFULLY CONVICTED PERSONS

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ABSTRACT¹

To date, the Innocence Project has worked to exonerate over 280 individuals who were wrongfully convicted.² As the population of exonerees grows, there is a need to examine the social consequences of wrongful conviction. Previous research has demonstrated that

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² *Innocence Project Case Profiles*, INNOCENCE PROJECT, <http://www.innocenceproject.org/know/> (last visited Mar. 9, 2012) [hereinafter *Innocence Project Case Profiles*].

individuals who are paroled from prison are discriminated against and stigmatized, and this research has suggested that exonerees may be stigmatized in a similar manner.³ Using correspondence bias as a theoretical framework, we examined this possibility through two separate studies. In Study One, participants read a newspaper article about either an exoneree or a guilty individual.⁴ In Study Two, participants read a newspaper article about either an exoneree, guilty, or average individual.⁵ We found that the guilty individual was generally stigmatized more than the exonerated. However, the exonerated were rated at or near the midpoint of the scale on some measures of stigma in Study One, indicating they may experience some stigma. In Study Two, we found the exonerated individual was stigmatized relative to the average individual on most measures of personal characteristics. However, the exonerated individual was not stigmatized on other measures relative to the average individual. The implications of these results, future directions for research, and policy recommendations are discussed below.

I. AFTER EXONERATION: AN INVESTIGATION OF STIGMA AND WRONGFULLY CONVICTED PERSONS

In 1989, Gary Dotson became the first person to be exonerated in the United States through the use of DNA evidence.⁶ Dotson was incarcerated for more than a decade prior to his exoneration⁷ and with his case, a new innocence movement was born.⁸ In the years since Dotson's exoneration, DNA evidence has exonerated over 280 individuals of crimes they did not commit.⁹ Seventeen of these exonerated individuals had been convicted of first-degree murder and were sentenced to death.¹⁰ Others were exonerated of violent crimes such as rape and assault.¹¹ These exonerations may

³ See discussion *infra* Part II.

⁴ See *infra* Table One.

⁵ See *infra* Table Two.

⁶ Rob Warden, *The Revolutionary Role of Journalism in Identifying and Rectifying Wrongful Convictions*, 70 UMKC L. REV. 803, 829 (2002).

⁷ JIM DWYER ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO EXECUTION AND OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED 39-40 (2000).

⁸ See *id.* at xiii-xiv.

⁹ *Innocence Project Case Profiles*, *supra* note 2.

¹⁰ *Id.*

¹¹ See, e.g., Kevin Byrd, INNOCENCE PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/Kevin_Byrd.php (last visited Mar. 9, 2012) [hereinafter *Kevin Byrd*] (describing Byrd's conviction for rape and his subsequent exoneration).

represent only a small proportion of all wrongful convictions, which some scholars have estimated to be in the tens of thousands.¹² Other scholars suggest that wrongful convictions occur in between one and fifteen percent of all cases.¹³

To date, most research dealing with wrongful conviction has examined why these mistakes occur¹⁴ and how to compensate those who have been wrongfully convicted.¹⁵ Other research has investigated the psychological effects of wrongful conviction from the perspective of the exonerated,¹⁶ but to date, only one study has examined the social consequences exonerates may experience as a result of their wrongful convictions by examining societal perceptions of the exonerated.¹⁷ The present research expands the literature on the stigma of wrongful conviction by examining how people perceive exonerates after release. Using social psychological theory on attribution to inform our research, we consider the stigma

¹² Samuel R. Gross et al., *Exonerations in the United States, 1989 Through 2003*, 95 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 523, 551 (2005).

¹³ C. Ronald Huff et al., *Guilty Until Proved Innocent: Wrongful Conviction and Public Policy*, 32 CRIME & DELINQ. 518, 522–23 (1986); Tony G. Poveda, *Estimating Wrongful Convictions*, 18 JUST. Q. 689, 704 (2001).

¹⁴ DWYER ET AL., *supra* note 7, at xvi–xvii; Saul M. Kassin et al., *Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and Recommendations*, 34 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 3, 4 (2010); Arye Rattner, *Convicted but Innocent: Wrongful Convictions and the Criminal Justice System*, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 283, 285–86 (1988); Gary L. Wells et al., *Eyewitness Identification Procedures: Recommendations for Lineups and Photospreads*, 22 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 603, 605 (1998).

¹⁵ Adele Bernhard, *Justice Still Fails: A Review of Recent Efforts to Compensate Individuals Who Have Been Unjustly Convicted and Later Exonerated*, 52 DRAKE L. REV. 703, 708 (2004); Cathleen Burnett, *Restorative Justice and Wrongful Capital Convictions: A Simple Proposal*, 21 J. CONTEMP. CRIM. JUST. 272, 280 (2005); Jeffrey Chinn & Ashley Ratliff, "I Was Put Out the Door with Nothing"—*Addressing the Needs of the Exonerated Under a Refugee Model*, 45 CAL. W. L. REV. 405, 412–13 (2009); Jennifer L. Chunias & Yael D. Aufgang, *Beyond Monetary Compensation: The Need for Comprehensive Services for the Wrongfully Convicted*, 28 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 105, 108–09 (2008); Alberto B. Lopez, *\$10 and a Denim Jacket? A Model for Compensating the Wrongly Convicted*, 36 GA. L. REV. 665, 690 (2002); Karin D. Martin, *A Model State Policy for the Treatment of the Wrongfully Convicted* 9 (Spring 2006) (unpublished Master's thesis, University of California at Berkeley); See Robert J. Norris, *Assessing Compensation Statutes for the Wrongly Convicted*, 23 CRIM. JUST. POL'Y REV. 1, 2–4 (Forthcoming 2012, Published Online 2011); Shawn Armbrust, Note, *When Money Isn't Enough: The Case for Holistic Compensation of the Wrongfully Convicted*, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 157, 160 (2004); Jessica R. Lonergan, Note, *Protecting the Innocent: A Model for Comprehensive, Individualized Compensation of the Exonerated*, 11 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 405, 411–12 (2008).

¹⁶ Adrian Grounds, *Psychological Consequences of Wrongful Conviction and Imprisonment*, 46 CANADIAN J. CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST. 165, 178 (2004) [hereinafter Grounds, *Psychological Consequences*]; Adrian T. Grounds, *Understanding the Effects of Wrongful Imprisonment*, 32 CRIME & JUST. 1, 2 (2005) [hereinafter Grounds, *Wrongful Imprisonment*].

¹⁷ Kimberley A. Clow & Amy-May Leach, Univ. of Ont. Inst. of Tech., Presentation at the Annual American Psychology-Law Conference: After Innocence: Perceptions of the Wrongfully Convicted (March 2009).

levied upon exonerees as compared to that upon parolees, and introduce crime type as a possible moderator of stigma.

II. INITIAL EVIDENCE FOR EXONEREE STIGMATIZATION

Though little research to date has examined exoneree stigma through an empirical lens, there has been considerably more work that explores exoneree stigma through an anecdotal framework. Some accounts suggest that people may be uncomfortable working alongside exonerees.¹⁸ One exoneree reports that the women at his workplace told their supervisor they were uncomfortable working alongside him because he had been convicted, albeit exonerated, of rape.¹⁹ Other anecdotal evidence suggests that community members are not willing to readily accept exonerees back into the communities from which they were originally arrested.²⁰ Another exoneree reported that upon returning to his hometown he was harassed and ridiculed, and once found the words "child killer" etched into the dirt on his truck.²¹ Yet another exoneree indicated that attempts were made to burn his house down.²²

This evidence suggests that exonerees may have a difficult time reintegrating into society, and research investigating the psychological consequences of wrongful conviction further supports this notion.²³ Case studies of individual exonerees have revealed evidence of post-traumatic stress disorder and a host of reentry problems, including but not limited to lack of practical life skills, fear of public places, and inability to connect with family members.²⁴ Other research has indicated that wrongful conviction is related to an increase in cynicism and mistrust on the part of the exonerees.²⁵

Thus, these examples demonstrate both that exonerees experience some level of stigma upon release and that they are at a disadvantage psychologically. However, we know little about the degree of stigma they experience or about how they are perceived in society. We therefore turn to social psychological research on

¹⁸ Chinn & Ratliff, *supra* note 15, at 434–35.

¹⁹ *Id.*

²⁰ Sandra D. Westervelt & Kimberly J. Cook, *Framing Innocents: The Wrongly Convicted as Victims of State Harm*, 53 CRIME L. & SOC. CHANGE 259, 270 (2010).

²¹ *Id.*

²² Grounds, *Psychological Consequences*, *supra* note 16, at 172.

²³ Chinn & Ratliff, *supra* note 15, at 434; Westervelt & Cook, *supra* note 21, at 270; Grounds, *Psychological Consequences*, *supra* note 16, at 165–82.

²⁴ Grounds, *Psychological Consequences*, *supra* note 16, at 168–70.

²⁵ *Id.* at 168.

correspondence bias to provide a theoretical basis for understanding how exonerees may be perceived.

III. CORRESPONDENCE BIAS AS A THEORETICAL BASIS FOR EXONEREE STIGMA

The most basic tenant of correspondence bias (also known as the fundamental attribution error) is that people tend to attribute others' behaviors to dispositional rather than situational factors.²⁶ Though there are some who disagree with the notion of correspondence bias,²⁷ the concept has been widely supported in the psychological literature.²⁸

In the case of exonerated individuals, observers may commit correspondence bias by attributing the initial conviction to the exoneree's perceived inherent criminality rather than to a flaw in the criminal justice system. If it occurs, this attribution will follow a three-step process.²⁹ First, the observer must make a causal judgment: to what action should a particular outcome be attributed?³⁰ This is the step in which the observer must determine what action caused the wrongful conviction.³¹ Did the exoneree supply a false confession? Was he³² involved peripherally in the crime but not primarily? Did he talk back to police when he was questioned? Did he resist arrest? Was he in the wrong place at the wrong time? In this phase, the observer would determine if the exoneree was initially suspected, tried, and convicted because of some perceived action he committed, or if he was the victim of a flawed legal system.³³

In the second step, the observer makes social inferences: what caused the action to occur?³⁴ Was the action the result of a characteristic of the exoneree, or the result of the environment or

²⁶ Edward E. Jones & Victor A. Harris, *The Attribution of Attitudes*, 3 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 1, 1 (1967); Lee Ross, *The Intuitive Psychologist and His Shortcomings: Distortions in the Attribution Process*, 10 ADVANCES EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 173, 174 (1977).

²⁷ Icek Ajzen, Carol Ann Dalto & Daniel P. Blyth, *Consistency and Bias in the Attribution of Attitudes*, 37 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1871, 1871 (1979); Arie W. Kruglanski & Icek Ajzen, *Bias and Error in Human Judgment*, 13 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 1, 1 (1983).

²⁸ See, e.g., Jones & Harris, *supra* note 26, at 1; Philip E. Tetlock, *Accountability: A Social Check on the Fundamental Attribution Error*, 48 SOC. PSYCHOL. Q. 227 (1985).

²⁹ Ross, *supra* note 26, at 175.

³⁰ *Id.*

³¹ *Id.*

³² Exonerees will be referred to using masculine pronouns as the vast majority are male.

³³ Ross, *supra* note 26, at 175.

³⁴ *Id.*

situation in which the exoneree was placed? During this phase, the observer would determine whether the cause of the wrongful conviction was due to a personal attribute (e.g., an inherent criminality), or whether it was caused by something situational (e.g., an intimidating interrogation, a misidentification, faulty forensic evidence, or snitch testimony).³⁵

It is during this second step that the critical error that may contribute to exoneree stigma is likely to occur. The observer may be more likely to conclude the exoneree's inherent criminality caused the wrongful conviction than to conclude the situation caused the wrongful conviction. This may be because prior research on correspondence bias shows people are more likely to attribute others' actions to their personal attributes rather than to situational factors.³⁶ Thus, the observer may neglect to correctly account for the situational factors over which the exoneree had no control, such as faulty forensic evidence or an incompetent attorney, and rather assume he caused his own wrongful conviction because he is a "bad person." Due to this conclusion, the observer may be more likely to stigmatize the exoneree than had the observer correctly weighed the situational influences.

Once the observer attributes the behavior to personal or situational characteristics, the observer moves on to the third and final phase: predictions about future outcomes and behaviors.³⁷ If the wrongful conviction has been attributed to personal characteristics, such as innate criminality, then the observer may be likely to assume the outcome, conviction, will happen again because the observer may assume the individual will continue to commit crime.³⁸ Thus, because of correspondence bias and misjudgment in the second phase of attribution, the observer may be likely to expect future criminality from the exoneree. Therefore, the exoneree may be stigmatized.

Indeed, research has suggested that innocence is not a protection against stigma after being associated with the criminal justice system.³⁹ In one classic study, researchers found that individuals who were accused but acquitted of assault had almost as much trouble finding unskilled employment as individuals who were

³⁵ *Id.*

³⁶ Jones & Harris, *supra* note 26, at 1; Ross, *supra* note 26, at 174.

³⁷ Ross, *supra* note 26, at 175.

³⁸ *Id.*

³⁹ Richard D. Schwartz & Jerome H. Skolnick, *Two Studies of Legal Stigma*, 10 SOC. PROBS. 133, 134-36, 142 (1962).

convicted of assault.⁴⁰ The researchers submitted four job applications for unskilled hotel worker positions to several hotels in New York.⁴¹ The applications were identical with the exception of the applicants' criminal histories; the applicants were either convicted of assault, tried and acquitted of assault, tried and acquitted with a letter from a judge certifying the acquittal, or had no criminal history.⁴² Applicants were more likely to be considered for a job if they had no criminal history compared to all other groups.⁴³ However, applicants with a letter certifying their acquittal were more likely to be considered than those without a letter, and those who were acquitted were more likely to be considered than those who were convicted.⁴⁴ This study demonstrates that merely being suspected of a crime can be detrimental to one's employment prospects, despite evidence of innocence.⁴⁵ It is possible that employers in this study committed correspondence bias in that they attributed the fact that the applicant was accused of a crime to dispositional characteristics like inherent criminality, which then may have caused the employers to be less responsive to the applicant. It is possible that exonerees may be stigmatized in a similar manner; being convicted of a crime, despite a later exoneration, may cause observers to commit correspondence bias, which may lead to stigmatization.

There are several explanations for why attribution errors occur.⁴⁶ A few explanations may help us to see why observers might make mistakes in understanding wrongful conviction. First, observers may be ignorant of the situational constraints operating in the exoneree's case.⁴⁷ Laypeople may be unaware that fingerprint and other forms of forensic evidence can be fallible,⁴⁸ that snitch testimony can be false and/or influenced by offering snitches incentives,⁴⁹ that eyewitnesses can make mistakes in

⁴⁰ *Id.* at 134–36.

⁴¹ *Id.* at 134.

⁴² *Id.* at 134–35.

⁴³ *Id.* at 135–36.

⁴⁴ *Id.* at 136.

⁴⁵ *Id.*

⁴⁶ See generally Daniel T. Gilbert & Patrick S. Malone, *The Correspondence Bias*, 117 PSYCHOL. BULL. 21 (1995) (providing an overview of the explanations for why attribution errors occur).

⁴⁷ *Id.* at 25.

⁴⁸ See Tamara F. Lawson, *Can Fingerprints Lie?: Re-weighing Fingerprint Evidence In Criminal Jury Trials*, 31 AM. J. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 2 (2003); see also Joel D. Lieberman et al., *Gold Versus Platinum: Do Jurors Recognize the Superiority and Limitations of DNA Evidence Compared to Other Types of Forensic Evidence?*, 14 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 27, 28 (2008).

⁴⁹ See Jeffrey S. Neuschatz et al., *The Effects of Accomplice Witnesses and Jailhouse*

identification,⁵⁰ or that confessions can be false and/or coerced.⁵¹ However, all of these are situational factors that have contributed to the wrongful conviction of individuals who have been exonerated with the help of the Innocence Project attorneys.⁵² For example, lay observers may not even consider a false confession or the circumstances leading to a false confession to be a situational constraint because they may blame that confession on the confessor.⁵³ That is, observers may assume that the confession arose from some criminality on the part of the confessor, rather than from a volatile interrogative environment.⁵⁴

Second, observers may have unrealistic expectations about what an innocent person is likely to do when accused of a crime.⁵⁵ For example, observers may assume that an innocent individual would never confess to a crime he did not commit or that an innocent individual would continue to maintain his innocence throughout the interrogation process.⁵⁶ Observers may assume that eyewitnesses are generally accurate, and therefore, if an eyewitness made a positive identification then the identified must be guilty in some way.⁵⁷ Many people believe that innocent suspects in the criminal justice system are protected by their innocence.⁵⁸ Thus, if a person was innocent and not protected by that innocence, observers may conclude that there was something criminal about the innocent yet convicted individual.

Third, observers may make inflated categorizations of the subject's behavior, meaning they may make the subject's behavior more important in the event than it truly is.⁵⁹ For example, if a snitch indicates that the subject committed the crime, observers

Informants on Jury Decision Making, 32 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 137, 146 (2008).

⁵⁰ See Wells et al., *supra* note 14, at 605; see also Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth A. Olson, *Eyewitness Testimony*, 54 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 277 (2003).

⁵¹ See Saul M. Kassir et al., *supra* note 14, at 51; see Saul M. Kassir & Gisli H. Gudjonsson, *The Psychology of Confessions: A Review of the Literature and Issues*, 5 PSYCHOL. SCI. PUB. INT. 33, 48, 49 (2004).

⁵² See generally DWYER ET AL., *supra* note 7, at 190 (describing exonerations aided by the Innocence Project).

⁵³ See Kassir & Gudjonsson, *supra* note 51, at 56, 57; see also Saul M. Kassir, *On the Psychology of Confessions: Does Innocence Put Innocents at Risk?*, 60 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 215, 223 (2005) [hereinafter Kassir, *On the Psychology of Confessions*].

⁵⁴ See Saul M. Kassir & Holly Sukel, *Coerced Confessions and the Jury: An Experimental Test of the "Harmless Error" Rule*, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 27, 42 (1997).

⁵⁵ See Kassir & Gudjonsson, *supra* note 51, at 57.

⁵⁶ *Id.*

⁵⁷ See Wells & Olson, *supra* note 50.

⁵⁸ See Kassir, *On the Psychology of Confessions*, *supra* note 53, at 216.

⁵⁹ See Neuschatz et al., *supra* note 49, at 139.

may assume it is because the subject is truly criminal rather than assuming that a snitch is motivated to lie.⁶⁰

Fourth, observers may make incomplete corrections once situational factors are exposed.⁶¹ If the individual is ultimately exonerated, having been convicted because of flaws in the system, observers might still associate the exonerated individual with criminality or make other negative attributions because they fail to correctly incorporate new situational information into their paradigms.⁶² Thus, it is possible that lay observers may make misattributions and stigmatize exonerees. That is, even though exonerees are ultimately deemed innocent, correspondence bias suggests that they may still experience stigma in society. Thus, similar to parolees who are guilty of their crimes and those accused of crimes but acquitted, exonerees may be treated differently in our society because of the stigma associated with being convicted of a crime.

One study on exoneree stigma used correspondence theory to explain why exonerated individuals may be stigmatized, and the researchers found that observers' perceptions of exonerees were affected by the type of evidence that caused the original conviction. This was especially true in cases in which the main evidence against the exoneree during the original trial had been a false confession or the testimony of a jailhouse snitch, which some have conceptualized as a "secondary confession."⁶³ Participants in this study also gave the exoneree who falsely confessed the lowest rating on scales measuring competency and warmth compared to those who had been convicted based on other evidence.⁶⁴ Additionally, participants desired a lower level of social closeness to the exoneree when the main evidence that convicted him was a false confession or a jailhouse snitch.⁶⁵ Thus, it appears that stigma was highest in those cases where observers assumed the exonerated individual contributed to his wrongful conviction by confessing.

This initial study examined variation in stigma in assessments of exonerees who were convicted based on different pieces of evidence; it did not compare perceptions of exonerees versus other

⁶⁰ *Id.*

⁶¹ See Kassir, *On the Psychology of Confessions*, *supra* note 53, at 223.

⁶² *See id.*

⁶³ Clow & Leach, *supra* note 17; see Neuschatz et al., *supra* note 49, at 137 (defining snitch testimony as a secondary confession).

⁶⁴ Clow & Leach, *supra* note 17.

⁶⁵ *Id.*

individuals. So, to further the exploration of exoneree stigma, Clow and Leach followed up with a study that measured how closely participants chose to physically sit next to an exonerated, guilty, or an average person with no history of interaction with the criminal justice system in an interaction scenario.⁶⁶ Participants chose to sit farther away from an exonerated person than the average or guilty person.⁶⁷ This finding suggests that the public might be more wary of exonerees than average people or people who were confirmed guilty.⁶⁸ These findings provide initial support for the theory that the public might stigmatize the exoneree because the public believes that the exoneree contributed to his own conviction, which supports the use of correspondence bias as a theoretical framework in the current study.

IV. COMPARING THE EXONEREE AND THE PAROLEE

Despite the dearth of research in the area of exoneree stigma, there is substantial research to support the stigmatizing effects of conviction on the parolee or the truly guilty individual. Given the previous research showing that acquitted individuals may be stigmatized similarly to guilty individuals in an interaction,⁶⁹ it is possible that exonerated individuals may be stigmatized similarly to guilty individuals in other areas as well. Research has demonstrated that guilty individuals who have been released from prison are subject to stigmatization that affects their ability to find work, secure housing, and generally participate in the community outside of the penal system.⁷⁰ This occurs despite the social assistance services provided to them upon release.⁷¹ Exonerees reentering society often receive no analogous social services, and if they are stigmatized in society then they still may struggle to find

⁶⁶ *Id.*

⁶⁷ *Id.*

⁶⁸ *Id.*

⁶⁹ Schwartz & Skolnick, *supra* note 39, at 136.

⁷⁰ See Roger Boshier & Derek Johnson, *Does Conviction Affect Employment Opportunities?*, 14 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 264, 266-67 (1974) (studying the employment opportunities after convictions of theft and drunken driving); Wouter Buikhuisen & Fokke P.H. Dijksterhuis, *Delinquency and Stigmatisation*, 11 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 185, 186 (1971) ("Our experiment shows conclusively that ex-delinquents are stigmatised when they apply for employment."); Chinn & Ratliff, *supra* note 15, at 442 ("[W]hen exonerees try to find employment, housing, or other social services, they face numerous barriers which reflect the stigma of being labeled a 'convict'—a mark that remains a part of their personal and, often, criminal record." (citing Lonergan, *supra* note 15, at 437-40)).

⁷¹ See Chinn & Ratliff, *supra* note 15, at 406-07.

employment and housing, and to participate in the community.⁷² Once exonerated, they are often not afforded the basic reentry services granted to parolees, such as psychological and physical health care or housing assistance,⁷³ and only twenty-seven states and the District of Columbia offer some form of compensation to exonerees.⁷⁴ Scholars suggest that, like the parolee, the exoneree's experiences in the first days and weeks after release will influence how successful his reentry will be.⁷⁵ Parolees have been stigmatized upon release even with the reentry services provided them.⁷⁶ Therefore, exonerees, who are afforded no services but may be faced with similar reentry challenges, may experience analogous problems.

V. CRIME TYPE AS A MODERATOR

Given that the evidence that contributed to a wrongful conviction can affect stigmatization,⁷⁷ it is possible that there are other moderators of the relationship between wrongful conviction and stigma. Previous research has indicated that crime type is related to ex-convict stigmatization in areas like employment decisions.⁷⁸ In this study, researchers sent three types of letters to three types of potential employers—each from a different type of applicant—one convicted of drunk-driving, one convicted of theft, and one with no mention of a criminal history.⁷⁹ All three individuals had the same qualifications—the only difference between the applicants was their

⁷² See *id.* at 407.

⁷³ See *id.* at 442–43.

⁷⁴ *Compensation for the Wrongly Convicted*, INNOCENCE PROJECT, <http://www.innocenceproject.org/fix/Compensation.php> (last visited Mar. 9, 2012).

⁷⁵ Heather Weigand, *Rebuilding a Life: The Wrongfully Convicted and Exonerated*, 18 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 427, 432 (2009).

⁷⁶ See generally Jeremy Travis, *Invisible Punishment: An Instrument of Social Exclusion*, in *INVISIBLE PUNISHMENT: THE COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES OF MASS IMPRISONMENT* 15, 16–36 (Marc Mauer & Meda Chesney-Lind eds., 2003) (discussing how a parolee's debt to society is never paid and how the status of offender serves as an invisible punishment even after release).

⁷⁷ Clow & Leach, *supra* note 17 (discussing two studies that demonstrated people are more likely to stigmatize an exoneree based upon their knowledge of the type of evidence which ultimately led to the exoneree's wrongful conviction).

⁷⁸ See generally Buikhuisen & Dijksterhuis, *supra* note 71 (studying the crimes of "drunken driving" and "theft").

⁷⁹ *Id.* at 186 (selecting three types of employers: "shipyards," "plants," and "assurance companies"). If the prospective employers had little concern over theft (because the job did not involve the handling of cash or valuable merchandise) that might explain why they were more wary of drunk drivers than thieves. *Id.*

criminal backgrounds.⁸⁰ The results showed that employers stigmatized the convicted and hired them less often than applicants with no criminal history, but that drunk drivers were stigmatized more than thieves.⁸¹ If crime type matters for the truly guilty, it may also be a significant stigmatizing factor for exonerees. Thus, we decided to vary crime type in this study.

VI. STUDY ONE

In Study One, we investigated the relative stigmatization of exonerees and guilty individuals, and introduced crime-type as a potential moderating variable. The paradigm for our study was based on the paradigm used in previous research.⁸² College student participants read a newspaper article about an individual who was either released from prison because he was paroled or exonerated. We varied the type of crime the target was initially convicted of—choosing crimes varying in level of severity. After reading the article, participants answered several sets of questions designed to measure stigma—participants rated the characteristics of the individual and answered several questions about desired level of interaction with that individual.

We hypothesized a main effect of defendant status on level of stigma. We expected that stigma levied on the guilty target would be higher than stigma levied on the exonerated target. However, we expected that both groups would experience some level of stigma.

We further hypothesized a main effect of type of crime on level of stigma. We expected to observe a positive relationship between severity of crime and level of stigma, levied on both the convict and the exoneree. Furthermore, we expected no interaction between defendant status and crime type. That is, we expected that if crime type moderated the stigmatization effect, it would do so for both the guilty target and the exonerated target.

A. Method

1. Participants

Participants were 350 undergraduate students from the

⁸⁰ *Id.*

⁸¹ *Id.*

⁸² Clow & Leach, *supra* note 17 (presenting the design of their study).

Department of Sociology and Criminology & Law at the University of Florida. A total of 119 cases were dropped due to manipulation-check failure (i.e., the student did not report correctly that the target was either guilty or exonerated or did not report the correct crime) or failure to meet age requirements, leaving a final sample size of 231 participants. Participants were mostly female (67%) and Caucasian (58%), and ranged in age from eighteen to forty-two years old with a mean age of 20.10 years. The majority of participants (71%) identified as criminology majors.

2. Materials—Simulated News Article

Participants were randomly assigned to receive one of eight simulated news articles. The news articles were presented as assignments written by local journalism students that were being presented to the participants for evaluation. Each article described a scenario in which a target, "Frank L. Jeffries," had been recently released from prison. The articles were identical with the exception of two components. In half of the articles, the target was presented as an ex-convict who had been recently paroled, and in the other half he was presented as an exoneree. The content of the articles also varied as to the type of crime the target was initially convicted of, presenting crimes varying in severity. The severity of a particular crime was based on the mandatory minimum sentence given upon conviction in the state of Florida. The target was presented as associated with a murder (the most severe crime), a sexual battery, an assault, or a robbery (the least severe crime).

3. Dependent Measures

After reading the news article, participants completed a seven-section questionnaire containing measures assessing their perceptions of the target, attributions for the target's conviction, desired closeness with the target, and the amount of societal assistance they believed should be provided the target. Participants indicated agreement with each item on a seven-point, Likert-type scale ranging from one (indicating strongly disagree) to seven (indicating strongly agree). Prior to analysis, all measures were coded so that higher numbers indicated a more positive evaluation of the target (i.e., less stigma). All scaled items are presented in Table One. Some measures were analyzed as individual items and are presented below.

In section one of the questionnaire, participants rated the target

on scales measuring their perceptions of the target's culpability and criminality. In addition, participants provided attribution ratings measuring whether participants attributed the target's conviction to personal or situational factors. In sections two and three, participants rated the target on measures of competency and warmth. To assess competency and warmth, we adapted items from competency scales used in previous research.⁸³ To measure competency, participants responded to the following individual items, with (R) indicating reverse-coded items:

- (a) [The target] is incompetent (R);
- (b) [The target] is confident;
- (c) [The target] is dependent (R);
- (d) [The target] is competitive;
- (e) [The target] is not intelligent (R).

To measure warmth, participants responded to the following items, again with (R) indicating reverse-coded items:

- (a) [The target] is intolerant (R);
- (b) [The target] is warm;
- (c) [The target] is good-natured;
- (d) [The target] is dishonest (R).

In section four, participants responded to measures designed to assess how close the participant was willing to be with the target. The closeness measures were adapted and updated from the Bogardus Social Distance Scale⁸⁴ and were divided into five subscales: personal closeness, familial closeness, closeness in housing, closeness in the workplace, and closeness in business dealings.

In section five, participants answered questions indicating whether the target should receive societal assistance. This section also contained the monetary-compensation scale and a single question that asked participants to indicate the financial allotment the target should receive. Response options were:

- 1) no money;
- 2) \$4,999 or less per year;
- 3) \$5,000-\$14,999 per year;
- 4) \$15,000-\$29,999 per year;
- 5) \$30,000-\$59,999 per year;
- 6) \$60,000-\$99,999 per year;
- 7) more than \$100,000 per year.

⁸³ Clow & Leach, *supra* note 17; Susan T. Fiske et al., *A Model of (Often Mixed) Stereotype Content: Competence and Warmth Respectively Follow From Perceived Status and Competition*, 82 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 878, 884 (2002).

⁸⁴ Emory S. Bogardus, *A Social Distance Scale*, 17 SOC. & SOC. RES. 265, 269 (1933).

Sections six and seven of the instrument asked participants to respond to demographic and manipulation-check questions, including a question about their perceptions of the conclusiveness of DNA evidence. We asked participants to respond to the question, "In your opinion, on a scale of one to ten, how conclusive is DNA evidence that is being used to match a crime to a perpetrator?" with one being not at all conclusive and ten being the most conclusive. We asked this question to investigate general perceptions of DNA evidence and to determine whether it was considered to be a probative type of evidence.⁸⁵ The manipulation check questions were designed to assess whether participants accurately remembered the type of crime the target was initially convicted of and whether the target was exonerated or paroled.

4. Procedure

Participants were told they were participating in an evaluation of a news article written by a journalism student that was to be published in a local newspaper. After obtaining informed consent, participants were randomly assigned to read one of the stimulus articles. The experimenter collected the articles before distributing the survey instrument to ensure participants could not refer back to the article when completing the questionnaire. Upon completion of the survey, participants were debriefed, awarded class credit, and thanked for their time.

5. Results

Four separate multivariate analyses of variance ("MANOVAs") were conducted with target status, crime type, and the interaction between these two variables as the independent variables and theoretically related constructs as the dependent measures. Prior to analysis, all participants who failed to notice manipulations in a true-false question (e.g., true or false: the subject of this article was exonerated of the crime he was originally convicted of) were eliminated from analyses to enable us to have the most conservative test of our hypotheses. In addition, on average, participants rated DNA evidence as very reliable—participants' average rating for the reliability of DNA evidence was 8.14 on the 10-point scale. Thus, participants who heard about a person who was exonerated with

⁸⁵ It was possible that if participants believed DNA to be an accurate form of identification, they might be less likely to stigmatize DNA exonerees.

DNA evidence most likely believed the veracity of the DNA exoneration.

a. Do target status and crime type influence perceptions of the target?

To test the effect of target status and crime type on participants' perceptions of the target, we first conducted a MANOVA with crime type, target status, and their interaction as the independent variables and participants' scaled ratings of the target's culpability, criminality, and the attribution of the target's behavior as the dependent variables. There was a main effect of target status on these measures, $\lambda = .48$, $F(3, 212) = 75.78$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .52$.⁸⁶ Follow-up univariate analyses revealed that the effect of target status was significant for all three scales.⁸⁷ Participants evaluated the exonerated target more positively than the guilty target on all measures.⁸⁸ Thus, participants believed the guilty target was more culpable, criminal, and personally responsible for the crime than the exonerated target. There was no main effect of crime type or effect of the interaction between target status and crime type on these dependent measures, all $ps > .05$.⁸⁹

To further explore whether participants' perceptions of the target varied as a function of crime type or target status, we conducted a second MANOVA with crime type, target status, and their interaction as the independent variables and the individual items designed to measure competency and warmth as the dependent variables. Results showed a significant main effect of target status on the collective variables, $\lambda = .73$, $F(8, 203) = 9.29$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .27$.⁹⁰ Follow-up univariate analyses were significant for measures of confidence, intelligence, warmth, good-naturedness, tolerance, and honesty. Participants viewed guilty individuals as less confident, less intelligent, less warm, and less good-natured than exonerated individuals.⁹¹ In addition, participants viewed exonerated individuals as more tolerant and honest than guilty individuals.⁹² There was no main effect of crime type or effect of the

⁸⁶ See *infra* Table Two.

⁸⁷ See *infra* Table Two.

⁸⁸ See *infra* Table Two.

⁸⁹ See *infra* Table Two.

⁹⁰ See *infra* Table Two for description of how different crime types affected target status.

⁹¹ See *infra* Table Two for associated means, confidence intervals, and univariate results.

⁹² See *infra* Table Two.

interaction between crime type and target status on these variables, all $ps > .05$.⁹³

b. Do target status and crime type influence desired closeness?

To test whether target status and crime type influenced participants' ratings of desired closeness to the target, we conducted a third MANOVA with target status, crime type, and their interaction as the independent variables and the closeness scales as the dependent variables. Results revealed a main effect of target status on the collective closeness scales, $\lambda = .73$, $F(5, 208) = 15.57$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .27$.⁹⁴ Follow-up univariate analyses indicated that this effect was significant for the personal, familial, housing, work, and business closeness scales. Specifically, participants reported wanting less personal, familial, housing, work, and business closeness with guilty individuals than with exonerees.⁹⁵ However, this main effect was qualified by a higher order interaction between crime type and target status, $\lambda = .88$, $F(15, 574.60) = 1.88$, $p < .05$, $\eta^2 = .43$.⁹⁶ Univariate analyses indicated the interaction was only significant for two of the closeness measures: personal and housing closeness.⁹⁷ The simple main effect of crime type within target status was significant for guilty targets (but not exonerated targets) for both of these scales. Participants reported wanting less personal closeness with those who were guilty of sexual battery than those who were guilty of robbery or assault, and less personal closeness with those who were guilty of murder than those who were guilty of robbery.⁹⁸ In addition, participants reported wanting less closeness in housing with guilty individuals who had been convicted of sexual battery or murder than with those who had been convicted of robbery or assault.⁹⁹

c. Do target status and crime type influence perceptions of deserved target compensation?

To test whether target status and crime type influenced perceptions of deserved target compensation, we conducted a fourth

⁹³ See *infra* Table Two.

⁹⁴ See *infra* Table Three.

⁹⁵ See *infra* Table Three.

⁹⁶ See *infra* Table Three.

⁹⁷ See *infra* Table Three.

⁹⁸ See *infra* Table Three.

⁹⁹ See *infra* Table Three.

MANOVA with crime type, target status, and the interaction between these two variables as the independent variables and the societal assistance and monetary compensation scales as the dependent variables. Results revealed a main effect of crime type on these scales, $\lambda = .99$, $F(6, 434) = 2.34$, $p < .05$, $\eta^2 = .31$.¹⁰⁰ However, this effect was not significant at the univariate level. There was also a main effect of target status on these scales, $\lambda = .46$, $F(2, 217) = 127.56$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .54$.¹⁰¹ Univariate analyses showed that participants believed guilty individuals should receive less societal assistance and monetary compensation than exonerated individuals. There was no effect of the interaction between the independent variables on these scales, $p > .05$.¹⁰²

To test whether crime type or target status influenced participants' perceptions of deserved compensation, we ran an ANOVA¹⁰³ with crime type, target status, and their interaction as the independent variables and the amount of financial allotment as the dependent variable. There was a main effect of target status on the amount of financial allotment, $F(1, 213) = 289.39$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .45$,¹⁰⁴ but no main effect of crime type or effect of the interaction between independent variables on this measure was observed, all $ps > .05$.¹⁰⁵ Participants assigned less post-release monetary compensation to guilty individuals than to exonerates.¹⁰⁶ Univariate analysis of the item asking participants how much compensation the target should receive each year once released from prison revealed that the mean response for guilty individuals was 1.67, which is in between the scale categories of zero and \$4,999 or less per year,¹⁰⁷ and the mean response for exonerated individuals was 3.98, which is in between the scale categories of \$5,000 to \$14,999 per year and \$15,000 to \$29,999 per year.¹⁰⁸

6. Study One Discussion

In this study, we sought to further the literature on social

¹⁰⁰ See *infra* Table Two.

¹⁰¹ See *infra* Table Two.

¹⁰² See *infra* Table Two.

¹⁰³ ANOVA stands for Analysis of Variance between groups. See generally M. Plonski, *Psychological Statistics: An Online Hypertext*, UNIV. OF WISCONSIN, <http://www4.uwsp.edu/psych/stat/12/anova-1w.htm> (last visited May 4, 2012).

¹⁰⁴ See *infra* Table Two.

¹⁰⁵ See *infra* Table Two.

¹⁰⁶ See *infra* Table Two.

¹⁰⁷ See *infra* Table Two.

¹⁰⁸ See *infra* Table Two.

consequences for exonerees by investigating whether stigma is applied to the guilty and the exonerated in a similar manner. Participants always regarded the guilty target more negatively than the exonerated target, supporting the prediction of a main effect of status on stigma. These findings suggest that participants were aware of the meaning of exoneration, and understood that the exonerated target was not guilty of the crime of which he had been previously convicted.

However, we also hypothesized that we would find some evidence of stigma for the exonerated targets. Using correspondence bias as a theoretical framework, we hypothesized that exonerees would be less stigmatized on measures of criminality, culpability, and closeness than the guilty, but would still be stigmatized to some degree because observers might attribute the exonerees' predicaments to personal rather than situational factors. Although we did not have a control group that allowed us to examine whether exonerees are stigmatized more than average members of society, we can examine the means of the scales to preliminarily assess whether exonerees are stigmatized. On items measuring the exoneree's confidence, good-naturedness, warmth, tolerance, honesty, competitiveness, and intelligence, scales measuring desired personal and family closeness, and scales measuring the exoneree's criminality, on average, the exoneree was rated near the mid-point of the measure.¹⁰⁹ This suggests the possibility that the exonerated target was not perceived overly positively (or overly negatively). These results are consistent with previous work investigating exoneree stigma,¹¹⁰ and provide some support for the notion that exonerees may be stigmatized. However, the results are limited because of the lack of a proper comparison group. Similar to previous research, not guilty targets who had been involved with the criminal justice system were stigmatized less than guilty targets.¹¹¹ However, recall that in that research, targets whom had been acquitted of the crimes they were accused of were stigmatized more than individuals with no history of contact with the criminal justice system.¹¹² It is possible that exonerated individuals may be

¹⁰⁹ See *infra* Table Four.

¹¹⁰ See Clow & Leach, *supra* note 17 (stating that ratings did not vary significantly among the exonerated, as there was no significant difference between those with positive and negative emotions).

¹¹¹ See Schwartz & Skolnick, *supra* note 39, at 135–36 (describing a study which concluded that employers, when hiring, are more likely to discriminate against convicts with records than the acquitted).

¹¹² See *id.* at 136 (discussing how being accused in the criminal justice system permanently

stigmatized more than individuals with no history of contact with the criminal justice system; however, in this study, we did not compare exonerated individuals with average citizens.

In the present study, we also predicted a main effect of crime type, such that crimes that were more severe, such as sexual battery and murder, would yield more stigma than crimes that were less severe, such as robbery and assault. We did not see this main effect of crime type. However, on participants' ratings of personal and housing closeness, we saw an interaction between crime type and target status. For the guilty target, crime type mattered on measures of personal and housing closeness; for the most part, targets convicted of the more severe crimes were stigmatized to a higher degree than those convicted of the less severe crimes. However, crime type did not significantly influence stigma for the exonerated target. This suggests that perhaps participants were successful in correcting for correspondence bias—if crime type mattered on those measures for the guilty target but not for the exonerated target, it is possible that participants successfully corrected for any effect of crime type that would be predicted by correspondence bias for exonerated targets.

In sum, analysis of these data confirmed previous findings in the ex-convict stigmatization literature; this study demonstrated that guilty individuals are subjected to stigma in housing, relationships, perceptions of character, and in the workplace. Additionally, these data somewhat replicated previous research,¹¹³ demonstrating that participants did not desire personal relationships with exonerees, although again, any conclusions we can make regarding exoneree stigma is limited because of the lack of proper comparison group. This study also expanded on those results by demonstrating that desired closeness in housing, work, and business relationships does not appear to be affected by wrongful conviction. However, the present study did not find exonerees to be stigmatized *more* than convicted individuals, as previous research examining how close participants sat next to exonerees, average, and guilty individuals suggests.¹¹⁴

Although the results of the present analysis provide partial support for previous work, again, the lack of a proper comparison (i.e., an individual with no history of contact with the criminal

disenfranchises the suspect even when they are acquitted).

¹¹³ Clow & Leach, *supra* note 17 (noting that study participants sat closer to the offenders than the exonerees).

¹¹⁴ *Id.*

justice system) limits the contribution of this study in the area of exoneree stigma. That is, although the current findings demonstrated that exonerees were stigmatized around the midpoint of the scales on certain measures, this level of stigma was not compared to stigma of the average people but rather to stigmatization of guilty individuals. As such, it is impossible to discern the severity of exoneree stigma without a different control condition to use as a comparison group. Thus, we conducted a second study that included three targets: an exoneree, a parolee, and an average individual with no prior contact with the criminal justice system.

VII. STUDY TWO

Study Two was conducted to further understand the stigmatizing effects of wrongful conviction by introducing a new control condition, an individual with no history of contact with the criminal justice system. Similar to Study One, participants read a fictional newspaper article about a target and provided ratings of the target designed to measure stigma. The target was either exonerated, paroled, or had no history of contact with the criminal justice system. Because the type of crime did not affect stigma for exonerated targets in Study One, we decided not to manipulate crime type in Study Two. We hypothesized that we would replicate results found in Study One. Specifically, we hypothesized that guilty individuals would be stigmatized more than the exonerated individuals. Additionally, we expected that exonerees would be stigmatized more than the average target.

A. Method

1. Participants

Participants were 253 undergraduate students drawn from the Departments of Sociology and Criminology & Law at the University of Florida. Participants from Study One were not eligible to complete Study Two. Participants who failed to correctly report that the target was either exonerated, paroled, or had no history with the criminal justice system were eliminated from analyses, leaving a final count of 186 participants. Participants were mostly female (65%) and Caucasian (61%) and ranged in age from eighteen to twenty-nine years with a mean age of 19.80 years. Most participants (80%) were criminology majors.

2. Materials—Simulated News Article

Participants were randomly assigned to receive one of nine simulated news articles. Similar to Study One, the news articles were presented as assignments written by local journalism students that were being presented to the participants for evaluation. Because of the addition of the control group, the subject of the article changed from an article about a person being released from prison to an article about a man entering a large university as a transfer student. The articles were identical with the exception of two components. The target in the article was either presented as an average individual (with no mention of history with the criminal justice system), an ex-convict, or an exoneree. We also attempted to vary the race of the subject in the article.¹¹⁵

3. Dependent measures

Participants completed a questionnaire using questions originally designed for Study One. To ensure that all questions were answerable for all targets, only items that did not include a reference to the crime were used for Study Two; the culpability and criminality scales were combined into one scale, and other scales were eliminated or calculated using fewer items.¹¹⁶ Participants also responded to the same individual items used in Study One designed to measure competency and warmth. Participants also filled out a demographic questionnaire, and manipulation checks were included at the end of the survey to assess whether participants correctly perceived the status of the target.

4. Procedure

The procedure for this study was the same as the procedure in Study One.

¹¹⁵ In addition to varying the target's status, we also attempted to vary the race of the target in exploring another possible moderator of the relationship between target status and stigma. However, our manipulation of race was not particularly strong; we only varied the typicality of the target's name and did not actually state the target's race or include a picture of the target. In addition, we did not include a diagnostic manipulation check question to test whether participants noticed the race manipulation. In analyses, we observed no main effects of target race or any effects of the interaction between target status and target race on our dependent measures. Thus, we collapsed across race conditions for the purposes of this paper and report analyses using target status as the only independent variable.

¹¹⁶ See *infra* Table One.

5. Results

Similar to Study One, four separate analyses were conducted with target status, crime type, and the interaction between these two variables as the independent variables and theoretically related constructs as dependent measures. Again, we only used variables that could be answered for all targets. Also similar to Study One, prior to analysis, all participants who failed to notice our manipulation in a true-false question were eliminated from analyses.

a. Does target status influence perceptions of the target?

To test whether target status influenced participants' perceptions of the target's criminality; we conducted a one-way MANOVA with target status as the independent variable and the criminality scale as the dependent variable. We found a significant effect of target status on perceptions of criminality. Post-hoc tests using Fisher's least significant difference ("LSD") test showed that participants rated the average and exonerated targets more positively than the guilty target; there was no significant difference between the average and exonerated targets.¹¹⁷

To test whether target status influenced participants' perceptions of the target's warmth and competence, we conducted a one-way MANOVA with target status as the independent variable and the individual items designed to measure competency and warmth as the dependent variables. We found an overall effect of target status on the collective dependent measures, $\lambda = .62$, $F(18, 338) = 5.12$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .21$.¹¹⁸ At the univariate level, there was an effect of target status on participants' perceptions of the target's competitiveness, confidence, intelligence, warmth, good-naturedness, and honesty.¹¹⁹ Post-hoc tests using LSD revealed that the exonerated target was seen as less competitive and confident than the average and guilty targets; there was no difference between the average and guilty targets on these measures.¹²⁰ In addition, the exonerated target was seen as less intelligent than the average target; again, there was no difference between the guilty and average target or the

¹¹⁷ See *infra* Table Four for means, confidence intervals, and results.

¹¹⁸ See *infra* Table Four.

¹¹⁹ See *infra* Table Four.

¹²⁰ See *infra* Table Four.

guilty and exonerated target on this measure.¹²¹ The exonerated target was seen as warmer and more good-natured compared to the guilty target, but less warm and good-natured compared to the average target.¹²² The average target was also perceived as warmer and more good-natured than the guilty target.¹²³ Last, the exonerated and average targets were seen as more honest than the guilty target; there was no difference between the exonerated and average targets on this measure.¹²⁴

b. Does target status influence desired closeness?

To test whether target status influenced participants' ratings of desired closeness with the target, we conducted a one-way MANOVA with target status as our independent variable and the closeness scales (personal, familial, housing, workplace, and business closeness) as our dependent variables. There was a significant effect of target status on the collective measures, $\lambda = .78$, $F(10, 340) = 4.49$, $p < .01$, $\eta^2 = .12$.¹²⁵ Univariate analyses revealed a significant effect of target status on participants' ratings of desired closeness in all measures: personal, familial, housing, workplace, and business closeness, although the effect of target status on workplace closeness ratings was only marginally significant.¹²⁶ Post-hoc tests using LSD showed that participants were more likely to want to be close to the average and exonerated targets compared to the guilty target on personal, familial, housing, workplace, and business levels.¹²⁷ For all of these measures, there were no significant differences between exonerated and average targets.¹²⁸

c. Does target status influence perceptions of deserved societal assistance?

To test whether target status influenced participants' ratings of deserved societal assistance; we conducted a one-way ANOVA with target status as the independent variable and the societal

¹²¹ See *infra* Table Four.

¹²² See *infra* Table Four.

¹²³ See *infra* Table Four.

¹²⁴ See *infra* Table Four.

¹²⁵ See *infra* Table Four.

¹²⁶ See *infra* Table Four.

¹²⁷ See *infra* Table Four.

¹²⁸ See *infra* Table Four.

assistance scale as our dependent variable. There was a significant effect of target status on the societal assistance measure.¹²⁹ Post-hoc tests using LSD showed that participants believed the exonerated target deserved more societal assistance than the average or the guilty targets; participants' ratings of deserved societal assistance for the average and guilty targets were not significantly different.¹³⁰

6. Study Two Discussion

In Study Two, we hypothesized that we would replicate the results we found in Study One in that the exonerated target would be stigmatized less than the guilty target.¹³¹ In addition, we added a new comparison group, an average person with no history of contact with the criminal justice system, so that we could examine whether the exonerated target would be stigmatized more than an average person.¹³² We hypothesized that even though the exonerated target would be stigmatized less than a guilty target, the exonerated target would be stigmatized more than an average target.¹³³ We also hypothesized that exonerees would be stigmatized compared to average individuals due to correspondence bias, a psychological principle that suggests individuals will attribute others' circumstances or behaviors to personal characteristics.¹³⁴

These hypotheses were partially supported. In evaluating the characteristics of the exonerated target, participants rated the exonerated target lower than the average target in competitiveness, confidence, intelligence, warmth, and good-naturedness.¹³⁵ However, in rating the criminality of the exonerated target, the exonerated target was evaluated similarly to the average target.¹³⁶ In addition, participants indicated that they were just as likely to want to be close to the exonerated target as the average target on all levels of closeness.¹³⁷ Thus, the fact that those ratings were near the midpoint of the scale in Study One is less significant. That is, it

¹²⁹ See *infra* Table Four for means, confidence intervals, and univariate results.

¹³⁰ See *infra* Table Four.

¹³¹ See *supra* Part VII.

¹³² See *supra* Part VII.

¹³³ See *supra* Part VII.

¹³⁴ See *supra* Part VII.

¹³⁵ See *infra* Table Four.

¹³⁶ See *infra* Table Four.

¹³⁷ See *infra* Table Four.

is possible that if we had included an average individual as a comparison group in Study One, participants would have rated that individual similarly. However, we did see that the exonerated target was evaluated more negatively than the average target for some measures of personal characteristics.

In addition, participants consistently evaluated the exonerated target more positively than the guilty target on almost all measures, with the exception of intelligence, competitiveness, and confidence.¹³⁸

Participants rated the exonerated target as less competitive and confident than the guilty target, but rated the exonerated and guilty targets no differently on the intelligence measure. This is inconsistent with results from Study One; in Study One, the exonerated target was seen as more intelligent and confident and no different in competitiveness than the guilty target.¹³⁹ This suggests that perhaps there is something about the different stimuli that may be causing the discrepancy. In Study One the stimulus was a story about an individual being released from prison,¹⁴⁰ whereas in Study Two, the stimulus was a story about an individual starting college.¹⁴¹ Future research could investigate whether context influences stigma for exonerees and parolees.

Last, participants supported the idea of assisting exonerees more than average or guilty targets; however, participants supported the idea of assisting guilty targets no more than they supported the idea of assisting average targets.¹⁴² This is also consistent with results from Study One.¹⁴³ This suggests that the public may see wrongful conviction as a wrong that deserves reparation. However, at least in this study, there did not appear to be a large amount of support for providing services to guilty individuals. It is possible that the public may not be sensitive to the needs of inmates as they reenter society, and does not recognize that these individuals may require more assistance than those who have not been involved in the criminal justice system.

Thus, it appears that the area in which exonerees may experience the largest amount of stigma is in peoples' evaluations of their personal characteristics. According to correspondence bias, it is

¹³⁸ See *infra* Table Four.

¹³⁹ See *infra* Table Two.

¹⁴⁰ See *supra* Part VI.A.2.

¹⁴¹ See *supra* Part VII.A.2.

¹⁴² See *infra* Table Four.

¹⁴³ See *infra* Table Two.

possible that participants may have evaluated the exonerees more negatively than average individuals on these measures because participants may have believed that something about the exoneree's personal characteristics may have contributed to the circumstances surrounding wrongful conviction. For example, participants may have believed that the exoneree was less intelligent than the average individual, which may have contributed to the circumstances of the wrongful conviction.

Conversely, it is also possible that participants evaluated exonerees more negatively than average individuals on these measures because the exoneree went through the experience of being wrongfully imprisoned and exonerated. For example, it is possible that participants rated the exoneree lower than the average individual on good-naturedness not because they believed that being less good-natured than an average individual contributed to the circumstances of the wrongful conviction, but because if one was imprisoned for a crime he did not commit, it might make him less good-natured. Future research could examine these possibilities. In any case, the findings that exonerees were evaluated more negatively than average individuals is consistent with previous research demonstrating that exonerated targets may be stigmatized more than both average and guilty targets in some instances.¹⁴⁴

Exonerees were evaluated no differently than average targets in participants' ratings of desired closeness. In addition, we replicated results from Study One showing that participants desired less closeness with guilty versus exonerated individuals. This suggests that even though people may evaluate the personal characteristics of exonerated individuals lower than average individuals, they are still open to being close to exonerees (at least as open as they are to being close to average individuals). Thus, in this initial study, people who were exonerated by DNA evidence were not stigmatized in the area of desired closeness. However, these findings are limited and further research is needed, as is discussed below.

VIII. GENERAL DISCUSSION

As of this writing, over 280 individuals have been exonerated of crimes they did not commit.¹⁴⁵ They have been convicted,

¹⁴⁴ Clow & Leach, *supra* note 17.

¹⁴⁵ *Innocence Project Case Profiles*, *supra* note 2.

imprisoned, and subsequently released because DNA evidence has demonstrated their innocence.¹⁴⁶ However, anecdotal evidence has suggested that exonerated individuals may be subjected to stigmatization in much the same way as ex-convicts.¹⁴⁷ Although a significant body of research has supported the notion that those who have committed or been accused of crimes are subjected to stigmatization,¹⁴⁸ little research has examined the extent to which exonerees have similar experiences. Correspondence bias¹⁴⁹ provides a theoretical basis to explain why exonerees may experience stigma, and preliminary research has demonstrated that exonerees may experience some level of stigma in our society.¹⁵⁰ The present studies endeavored to provide an empirical analysis of the extent to which exonerees are stigmatized relative to parolees and the extent to which the stigmatization of both groups differs from that of individuals without previous criminal justice contact.

The results of both studies indicate that exonerees may experience some level of stigma associated with wrongful conviction.¹⁵¹ However, that stigma appears to be limited to participants' evaluations of the personal characteristics of the individual, and not whether observers would desire to be close to the individual or would support societal assistance or compensation for the individual. It is also possible that the effects observed are indicative of a construct other than stigma related to the targets' wrongful convictions. For example, it is possible unstated issues of race or class may have affected participants' ratings, or that participants may not have been fearful of the wrongful conviction itself, but rather of how the incarceration experience or experience of wrongful imprisonment may have affected the target's personal characteristics.

These results may also be better understood by considering participants' likely perceptions of DNA evidence. Participants in Study One rated DNA evidence as a very reliable form of evidence on average. Given that the exonerated targets in both studies had been exonerated by DNA evidence and participants in Study One rated DNA evidence as highly reliable, it is therefore possible that

¹⁴⁶ *Id.*

¹⁴⁷ Warden, *supra* note 6, at 842; Chinn & Ratliff, *supra* note 15, at 433-34; Lonergan, *supra* note 15, at 437; Westervelt & Cook, *supra* note 21, at 270.

¹⁴⁸ Schwartz & Skolnick, *supra* note 39, at 136; Boshier & Johnson, *supra* note 70, at 268; Buikhuisen & Dijksterhuis, *supra* note 70, at 186.

¹⁴⁹ Jones & Harris, *supra* note 27, at 1-2.

¹⁵⁰ Clow & Leach, *supra* note 17.

¹⁵¹ See *infra* Table One.

participants may have been more likely to have faith in the actual innocence of the exonerated target than if the target had been exonerated by another form of evidence. The perceived veracity of DNA evidence may have therefore impacted participants' perceptions of exonerees. However, not all exoneration are DNA exoneration. It is possible that there may be something unique about a DNA exoneration compared to a non-DNA exoneration. Future research could investigate this possibility.

In both Studies One and Two, participants seemed mostly receptive to the exonerated targets as they reentered the community.¹⁵² However, the results of the analyses demonstrated some deviation from these general findings. Exonerees were stigmatized at or below the midpoint of the scale on several measures in Study One, and were stigmatized on measures of competitiveness, confidence, intelligence, warmth, and good-naturedness in Study Two.¹⁵³ It would appear that correspondence bias did not operate as strongly as predicted because participants in Study One did not perceive exonerees as culpable or criminal compared to parolees, did not attribute their convictions to internal causes compared to parolees, did not stigmatize exonerees in housing, work, or business dealings compared to parolees, and suggested that exonerees should be allotted reentry and financial assistance.

In Study Two comparing exonerees to average individuals, exonerees were stigmatized on measures of their personal characteristics.¹⁵⁴ However, participants in Study Two did not rate exonerees as significantly different from average targets' measures of desired closeness or criminality, indicating that perhaps the area that exonerees are most likely to experience stigma is in peoples' perceptions of their personal characteristics.¹⁵⁵

In sum, analysis of these data confirmed previous findings in the ex-convict stigmatization literature as they demonstrated that guilty individuals are subjected to stigmatization on most measures of stigma.¹⁵⁶ In addition, these findings somewhat replicate previous work on exoneree stigma,¹⁵⁷ which demonstrated that participants did not desire personal relationships with exonerees.

¹⁵² See *infra* Tables Two and Four.

¹⁵³ See *infra* Tables Two and Four.

¹⁵⁴ See *infra* Table Four.

¹⁵⁵ See *infra* Table Four.

¹⁵⁶ See Travis, *supra* note 76, at 18.

¹⁵⁷ Clow & Leach, *supra* note 17.

Further, the evidence of stigma in Study Two is consistent with previous findings that exonerees may be the most stigmatized of these three groups in some situations.¹⁵⁸

The present work also expands on previous studies by demonstrating that desired closeness in housing, work, and business relationships does not appear to be affected by wrongful conviction. These studies add new information to the literature examining the social consequences of wrongful conviction by demonstrating that the public may understand that wrongful conviction is the result of a flawed criminal justice system. Further, the present results suggest exonerees may be able to successfully reintegrate into society; the public may understand they are not criminals, but rather victims.

A. Limitations

Interpretation of the results of the present studies is, however, restricted by a number of limitations. Participants in both studies were college students who were taking undergraduate classes in criminology and who may represent a suboptimal sample for a variety of reasons, including issues of validity and generalizability.¹⁵⁹ Further, the majority of participants in both studies (71% and 80%, respectively) identified themselves as criminology majors. As criminology majors, it is possible that they had been previously educated about cases of wrongful conviction and therefore may differ from the general population in their perceptions of exonerees and wrongful convictions. As a result, it is possible that participants in these studies viewed exonerees more favorably than a non-student might. Additionally, because they were mostly criminology students, it is possible that participants were more educated about the veracity of DNA evidence than the average person. This may have affected their perceptions because they may have been more likely than the average person to understand the conclusive nature of DNA exoneration. As such, participants may have been more likely to believe the exonerated target was actually innocent, which may have affected their ratings of the target. Thus, it may be that we inadvertently used a sample that was not very likely to stigmatize exonerees. Given that we saw

¹⁵⁸ *Id.*

¹⁵⁹ See Brian K. Payne & Allison Chappell, *Using Student Samples in Criminological Research*, 19 J. CRIM. JUST. EDUC. 175, 185 (2008) (reviewing the disadvantages of college student samples in criminological research).

some evidence of stigma in these studies, it may be likely that exonerees would be stigmatized more in society in general.

A further limitation is related to ecological validity. In these studies, participants' only exposure to targets was a single news article. In a real-world situation, observers may be exposed to a host of media coverage of a crime or an exoneration that may impact observers' assessments. It is highly unlikely that observers' only exposure would be a single news article. It is possible that the presentation of a single stimulus did not simulate real world conditions, which may suppress effect sizes. An additional ecological validity issue relates to how seriously participants took the task of assessing the targets. Participants in these studies participated for class credit and that credit was not affected by how much effort they put into answering the questions. It is possible participants did not take the task seriously and, as such, did not read the stimulus carefully or take time to consider their answers.

B. Directions for Future Research

Given these limitations, future research should replicate the present findings with a more heterogeneous sample and further investigate the conditions that may moderate exoneree stigmatization. Possible avenues for inquiry include the moderating effect of context on stigmatization, as well as the potential contribution of factors such as race or ethnicity, socioeconomic status, age, and gender. An additional factor that warrants investigation is the potential moderation of type of exoneration evidence. These studies investigated stigmatization of a specific class of exoneree, namely those who had been exonerated by DNA evidence. Although DNA is the most commonly referenced catalyst for the overturning of a wrongful conviction,¹⁶⁰ it is not the only path to exoneration. Future research should investigate the stigma of DNA exonerees compared to exonerees whose release was secured by other types of evidence to discern whether the public is more receptive to one class of exoneree as compared to another.

To triangulate upon findings presented in the current work, it would also be prudent to interview and survey wrongfully convicted individuals about their experiences. By comparing whether or not exonerees' personal experiences with post-release stigmatization are congruent with surveys of potential stigmatizers, results of the

¹⁶⁰ See *Innocence Project Case Profiles*, *supra* note 2.

present work can either be confirmed or reassessed. To the extent that exoneree stigma is observed, future research should investigate methods to mitigate this effect.

C. Policy Implications

The findings from the present work suggest that the public would support increasing re-entry services for exonerees. Furthermore, the current research supports the provision of monetary compensation to exonerees. Currently, not all states provide the wrongfully convicted with financial compensation upon exoneration.¹⁶¹ The present research suggests that the public might be supportive of financial compensation for this population.

In addition to financial compensation, other researchers have called for the provision of an official statement of innocence, speedy expungement, and appropriate reentry support for exonerees.¹⁶² These measures of peripheral support may assist exonerees in their transition from prison to freedom, and may also provide public recognition of innocence that may mitigate stigmatization by the public. Future research could investigate whether such modes of support are welcomed by the public; preliminary evidence from this study suggests that such measures would be likely supported and future research could investigate whether such support mitigates stigmatization. By providing this manner of assistance the criminal justice system further asserts that the individual who has been exonerated was unjustly confined, which may prevent the public from assuming a condemnatory attitude toward exonerees upon their reentry.

IX. CONCLUSION

Since its inception in 1992, the Innocence Project has aided in the exonerations of over 280 people who were convicted of crimes they did not commit.¹⁶³ As exonerations have increased, so has the body of research investigating the causes of wrongful conviction. However, little prior research has investigated its social consequences. The present work adds to the wrongful conviction

¹⁶¹ *Id.*; Norris, *supra* note 15, at 3, 15.

¹⁶² Armbrust, *supra* note 15, at 171; Burnett, *supra* note 15, at 282-84; Chunias & Aufgang, *supra* note 15, at 128; Lopez, *supra* note 15, at 722; Martin, *supra* note 15, at 4, 8, 11, 13; Norris, *supra* note 15, at 3.

¹⁶³ *Innocence Project Case Profiles*, *supra* note 2.

literature by examining the differences in stigma against guilty, wrongfully convicted, and average individuals. The results of two studies suggest that guilty individuals are more stigmatized than exonerated individuals, regardless of crime type, but that exonerated individuals are more stigmatized than average individuals. In Study One, exonerees were stigmatized at or below the midpoint of scales measuring personal and familial closeness, indicating that this population may be stigmatized to some degree.¹⁶⁴ In Study Two, exonerees were stigmatized more than average individuals on measures of personal characteristics.¹⁶⁵ On all other measures, exonerated individuals were not stigmatized more than average individuals. It is possible that these findings may be limited to this sample, so future research is necessary to further investigate the present findings and to analyze stigma from the exonerees' points of view. As the population of exonerees continues to grow, more research is necessary to examine the consequences of wrongful conviction and the difficulties exonerees experience upon release.

¹⁶⁴ See *infra* Table Two.

¹⁶⁵ See *infra* Table Four.

TABLE ONE: SCALES AND INDIVIDUAL ITEMS USED IN
STUDIES ONE AND TWO

Scale	Items	Study One α	Study Two α
Culpability	[The target] is not guilty of the crime he went to prison for ¹ [The target] did not deserve to be in prison ¹ I am suspicious of [the target] (R) [The target] is no more dangerous than the average person [The target] deserves to have the same rights and privileges that I have	.86	.70
Criminality	[The target] will not commit a crime in the future [The target] will be arrested in the future (R) [The target] will return to prison (R) ¹	.86	NA
Behavioral attribution	It is [the target's] fault that he went to prison (R) ¹ [The target] is a victim of a flawed criminal justice system ¹ [The target] caused his own conviction (R) ¹	.91	NA
Personal closeness	I would be willing to be friends with [the target] I would be willing invite [the target] over to my house for dinner I would not be willing to spend time alone with [the target] (R) I would be willing to share a cab with [the target]	.83	.75

Familial closeness	I would be willing to let my sister or daughter go on a date with [the target]	.79	.84
	I would be willing to let my kids play with [the target]'s kids I would not be willing to let [the target] babysit my little brother (R) I would not be willing to let [the target] be my child's schoolteacher (R)		
Housing closeness	I would be willing to be roommates with [the target] I would be willing to live next door to [the target] I would not be willing to live in the same apartment complex as [the target] (R) I would not be willing to live in the same neighborhood as [the target] (R)	.82	.73
Workplace closeness	I would be willing to work in the same office as [the target] I would not be willing to share a cubicle with [the target] (R) I would be willing to collaborate on a project with [the target] I would not be willing to let [the target] be my boss (R)	.82	.71
Business closeness	I would not be willing to rent an apartment to [the target] (R) I would not be willing to hire [the target] for a job (R) I would be willing to lend money to [the target] I would be willing to be business partners with [the target]	.81	.73

Societal assistance	<p>The government should not help [the target] find a job (R)</p> <p>The government should help [the target] get his record expunged¹</p> <p>The government should help [the target] find a place to live</p> <p>[The target] should get government-sponsored family counseling</p> <p>[The target] should not receive legal assistance from the government (R)</p>	.77	.72
Monetary compensation	<p>[The target] should receive monetary compensation for the years he spent in prison¹</p> <p>[The target] deserves restitution for the time he spent behind bars¹</p> <p>The government does not owe [the target] anything for the years he spend in prison (R)¹</p> <p>[Target] should not get any money to start his life outside of prison (R)¹</p>	.92	NA

Note: ¹Indicates items used in Study One only; For Study Two, relevant items from the culpability scale and criminality scales used in Study One were combined into one scale measuring overall criminality. Alpha levels reported for each study include only the items included for analyses in that study.

TABLE TWO: STUDY ONE MEANS (95% CONFIDENCE INTERVALS)
AS A FUNCTION OF TARGET STATUS

Scale/Measure	Means (CIs)		Univariate effect of target status		
	Guilty Target	Exonerated Target	<i>F</i>	<i>df</i>	Partial η^2
Culpability*	3.30 (3.10, 3.49)	5.18 (4.98, 5.38)	178.44	1, 214	.46
Criminality*	3.57 (3.40, 3.75)	4.09 (3.91, 4.27)	16.28	1, 214	.07
Behavioral attribution*	3.08 (2.85, 3.31)	5.36 (5.12, 5.59)	186.95	1, 214	.47
Confident**	3.73 (3.56, 3.91)	4.06 (3.89, 4.23)	7.01	1, 210	.03
Good-natured*	3.05 (2.89, 3.22)	3.94 (3.78, 4.11)	55.01	1, 210	.21
Warm*	3.23 (3.08, 3.38)	3.97 (3.82, 4.12)	28.99	1, 210	.21
Tolerant*	3.94 (3.78, 4.10)	4.31 (4.15, 4.47)	10.46	1, 210	.18
Honest**	3.66 (3.49, 3.84)	4.02 (3.85, 4.20)	8.20	1, 210	.04

Intelligent**	3.99 (3.78, 4.21)	4.32 (4.10, 4.53)	4.46	1, 210	.02
Personal closeness*	2.91 (2.70, 3.13)	4.00 (3.79, 4.22)	49.85	1, 212	.19
Family closeness*	2.48 (2.26, 2.70)	3.78 (3.56, 4.01)	65.73	1, 212	.24
Housing closeness*	3.17 (2.96, 3.38)	4.26 (4.04, 4.67)	50.00	1, 212	.19
Work closeness*	3.61 (3.39, 3.83)	4.59 (4.37, 4.81)	38.53	1, 212	.15
Business closeness*	3.23 (3.02, 3.45)	4.22 (4.01, 4.44)	40.57	1, 212	.16
Societal assistance*	4.40 (4.20, 4.60)	5.36 (5.16, 5.57)	43.72	1, 218	.17
Monetary compensation*	2.81 (2.56, 3 .06)	5.61 (5.36, 5.86)	435.92	1, 218	.53
Financial allotment*	1.67 (1.43, 1.91)	3.98 (3.37, 4.22)	289.32	1, 213	.45

Note: For clarity, the adjectives used in competence and warmth measures reflect transformed values (e.g., for the measure '[the target] is dishonest', the adjective used to describe the measure above is 'honest', reflecting that the value was transformed so higher numbers indicate a more positive evaluation); *p < .05; **p < .01.

TABLE THREE: MEANS (95% CONFIDENCE INTERVALS) FOR DESIRED PERSONAL CLOSENESS AND HOUSING CLOSENESS AS A FUNCTION OF TARGET STATUS AND CRIME TYPE

Guilty Target								
Measure	Means (CI)				Univariate effect of target status			
	Robbery	Assault	Sexual Battery	Murder	F	df	p	partial η^2
Personal closeness	3.28 _{ac} (2.89, 3.68)	3.21 _b (2.76, 3.66)	2.53 _{ab} (2.12, 2.95)	2.63 _c (2.17, 3.08)	3.28	3, 212	.02	.04
Housing closeness	3.62 _{ac} (3.22, 4.01)	3.52 _{bd} (3.08, 3.97)	2.68 _{ab} (2.27, 3.09)	2.87 _{cd} (2.41, 3.32)	4.88	3, 212	.01	.07
Exonerated Target								
Measure	Means (CI)				Univariate effect of target status			
	Robbery	Assault	Sexual Battery	Murder	F	df	p	partial η^2
Personal closeness	3.90 (3.44, 4.37)	3.82 (3.38, 4.25)	4.12 (3.73, 4.50)	4.17 (3.73, 4.61)	.62	3, 212	.61	.01
Housing closeness	4.14 (3.68, 4.61)	4.16 (3.73, 4.59)	4.44 (4.06, 4.82)	4.28 (3.84, 4.72)	.45	3, 212	.72	.01

Note: Means sharing subscripts are significantly different at $p < .05$; for example, if two means share a subscript 'a', they are significantly different from each other. So, in the table above, for the guilty target, participants rated the target significantly higher on personal closeness if he committed robbery versus sexual battery.

TABLE FOUR: STUDY TWO MEANS (95% CONFIDENCE INTERVALS) AS
A FUNCTION OF TARGET STATUS

Scale/Measure	Means (CIs)			F	df	p	partial η^2
	Average Target	Exonerated Target	Guilty Target				
Criminality	5.12 _a (4.89, 5.32)	5.13 _b (4.92, 5.34)	4.30 _{ab} (4.07, 4.54)	16.60	2, 164	.01	.17
Competitive	5.13 _a (4.85, 5.40)	4.40 _{ab} (4.11, 4.70)	4.99 _b (4.64, 5.32)	6.68	2, 177	.01	.07
Confident	5.43 _a (5.19, 5.67)	4.61 _{ab} (4.36, 4.87)	5.12 _b (4.81, 5.41)	10.60	2, 177	.01	.11
Intelligence	6.10 _a (5.81, 6.39)	5.47 _a (5.16, 5.78)	5.78 (5.43, 6.14)	4.37	2, 177	.01	.05
Warmth	4.65 _{ab} (4.46, 4.84)	4.26 _{ac} (4.05, 4.46)	3.83 _{bc} (3.59, 4.06)	14.45	2, 177	.01	.14
Good-natured	5.19 _{ab} (4.96, 5.43)	4.71 _{ac} (4.46, 4.96)	3.74 _{bc} (3.45, 4.03)	29.88	2, 177	.01	.25
Honest	4.93 _a (4.69, 5.17)	4.76 _b (4.50, 5.02)	4.24 _{ab} (3.94, 4.54)	6.48	2, 177	.01	.07
Personal closeness	4.92 _a (4.70, 5.14)	5.00 _b (4.74, 5.25)	3.99 _{ab} (3.70, 4.27)	16.59	2, 174	.01	.16

Familial closeness	4.45 _a (4.17, 4.73)	4.55 _b (4.22, 4.87)	3.26 _{ab} (2.90, 3.62)	16.84	2, 174	.01	.16
Housing closeness	4.73 _a (4.47, 4.99)	4.85 _b (4.55, 5.16)	4.12 _{ab} (3.78, 4.46)	5.75	2, 174	.01	.06
Workplace closeness	4.93 _a (4.71, 5.16)	5.03 _b (4.77, 5.29)	4.57 _{ab} (4.28, 4.86)	2.96	2, 174	.06	.03
Business closeness	4.39 _a (4.13, 4.64)	4.55 _b (4.25, 4.85)	3.82 _{ab} (3.48, 4.15)	5.65	2, 174	.01	.06
Societal assistance	4.38 _a (4.13, 4.67)	5.57 _{ab} (5.32, 5.81)	4.66 _b (4.38, 4.94)	23.52	2, 167	.01	.06

Note: For clarity, the adjectives used in competence and warmth measures reflect transformed values (e.g., for the measure '[the target] is dishonest', the adjective used to describe the measure above is 'honest', reflecting that the value was transformed so higher numbers indicate a more positive evaluation; shared subscripts indicate significant differences between means; see Table 3 Note for clarification).

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